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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES 
AND STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS: WHY ILLINOIS 
GOT IT RIGHT IN JANE DOE V. MATCH.COM
MARTY GOULD*
INTRODUCTION
Jane Doe, a young woman from Chicago, Illinois, signed up for 
Match.com, the well-known Internet dating website.1 Like tens of thou-
sands of other Chicago-area Match.com subscribers, Jane was looking to 
meet a nice young man—a Chicago guy who had similar interests and val-
ues. Match.com “matched” Jane Doe with Ryan Logan.2 In December 
2009, Jane and Ryan went on a date in Chicago, and during that date, Jane 
was sexually abused and raped.3
According to the allegations in Jane Doe’s complaint, prior to “match-
ing” Jane Doe and Ryan Logan, Match.com received a written notice from 
another of its Chicago-area female subscribers, J.N., alerting Match.com 
that Ryan Logan raped J.N after the two were introduced to one another on 
the site and met for a social encounter.4 Despite receiving this written 
* The author is an attorney at Romanucci & Blandin, LLC. He graduated from Chicago-Kent College of 
Law in 2014 and received his bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University. The author would like 
to thank Daniel S. Kirschner and Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. for their invaluable guidance and com-
ments.  
 1.  Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012) 
(order granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, denying motion to dismiss, and trans-
ferring case for further proceedings). 
 2.  Id.
 3.  Id. In November 2010, Ryan Logan was found guilty of the criminal sexual assault against 
Jane Doe. See Marc Karlinsky, Match.com Must Face Dispute over User, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Dec. 
18, 2013), 
http://www.corboydemetrio.com/media/publication/58_15454%20Corboy%20reprint%20Dec18-
2013.pdf. The Cook County judge later vacated the conviction and found Ryan Logan guilty of unlaw-
ful restraint and criminal sexual abuse, a lesser charge, instead. Jason Meisner, Man Gets 90 Days in 
Jail for Sex Abuse, Restraint, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2011,  
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-02-25/news/ct-met-date-rape-sentence-20110225_1_judge-
vacates-assault-charges-restraint.  
 4.  Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 1; Karlinsky, supra note 3. While convicted of raping 
Jane Doe, Ryan Logan was acquitted of sexual assault for the J.N. incident that allegedly occurred two 
years earlier. See Matthew Walberg, Man Who Used Online Dating Site Convicted of Assault: Judge 
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672 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:2 
warning concerning Ryan Logan, Match.com failed to remove Ryan from 
its service, failed to contact the Chicago Police Department, and failed to 
warn other customers, like Jane Doe, who interacted online with Ryan.5
In 2011, Jane Doe filed a civil suit against Match.com and Ryan Lo-
gan in an Illinois state court asserting, inter alia, claims of negligence, 
willful and wanton misconduct, and violation of the Illinois Dating Referral 
Services Act against Match.com,6 and claims of battery and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against Ryan Logan.7 Generally, the plain-
tiff in a civil case has the right to choose the forum in which her dispute 
will be heard, so long as the forum chosen is one that has subject matter 
jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant.8 Because Jane was a resident of Illinois, Match.com advertised its ser-
vices to Illinois consumers, Jane used Match.com’s services while in 
Illinois, and the rape occurred in Illinois by another Illinois resident—one 
would naturally assume that Illinois would be the proper venue to decide 
Jane’s case. 
However, there was one problem: Match.com’s Terms of Use Agree-
ment contained a choice of law and forum selection clause that required 
any disputes arising out of a subscriber’s use of its website or service to be 
resolved under Texas law in a Dallas, Texas courtroom.9 A forum selection 
clause is a provision in a contract designating a particular forum—such as a 
specific state, county, or court—as the only proper venue in which the par-
ties to an agreement must litigate any future disputes.10 To complicate mat-
ters further, Illinois has a consumer protection statute, called the Illinois 
Dating Referral Services Act (IDRSA)11 which applies to any contract be-
tween a dating enterprise and an Illinois consumer for dating services. 
Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement, including the choice of law and 
forum selection clause, is directly in conflict with several provisions of the 
IDRSA—particularly the IDRSA’s “anti-waiver” provision.12
 5.  Second Amended Complaint at Law at 2–5, Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249 
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 23, 2011).  
 6.  See generally id. 
 7.  Id. at 14. 
 8.  See, e.g., Dawdy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 797 N.E.2d 687, 694 (Ill. 2003) (holding that “[a] 
plaintiff’s right to select the forum is substantial . . . [and] should rarely be disturbed”).  
 9.  Defendant Match.com, L.L.C.’s Section 2-619 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended 
Complaint at Law at exhibit 1, at cl. 23, Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
July 6, 2011) [hereinafter Match.com Motion to Dismiss].
 10.  17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2014). 
 11.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/1 to -55 (West 2008). 
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2015] CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 673 
The issue here is, what is the stronger, more significant interest—the 
forum state’s laws or forum selection clauses that abrogate the forum 
state’s laws? In that vein, should Match.com’s forum selection clause be 
enforceable despite being in conflict with the IDRSA? In other words, to 
what extent can companies contract out of state consumer protection stat-
utes (such as the IDRSA) through the use of choice of law and forum selec-
tion clauses in standard form adhesion contracts? 
The only court in Illinois to rule on the issue held that the IDRSA 
voids forum-selection clauses opposing the stated Illinois public policy, as 
declared by Illinois statutes.13 Outside of Illinois, however, federal courts 
have held that the exact same Match.com forum-selection clause was valid 
and enforceable despite being in direct conflict with similar statutes in oth-
er states.14 While the Illinois court permitted the plaintiff to pursue her 
claims in Illinois,15 other federal courts considering the same issue held 
that, pursuant to Match.com’s forum selection clause, the claims against 
Match.com must be pursued in a Dallas, Texas court.16 These cases repre-
sent a split in decision and analysis—pitting the values of individual auton-
omy against federalism and a state’s right to choose how it protects its citi-
citizens. This Article takes the position that the Illinois court arrived at the 
correct result. 
Part I of this Article discusses Jane Doe v. Match.com17—the relevant 
Illinois case. Part II discusses Brodsky v. Match.com,18 one of the main 
Match.com cases at odds with the Illinois decision. Part III discusses why 
the Illinois case is correct, highlighting the legal reasons under both Illinois 
and federal law. Finally, Part IV discusses why public policy reasons justi-
fy and support the conclusion reached by the Illinois court. 
 13.  Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 7 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012).  
 14.  See Gamayo v. Match.com L.L.C., No. C 11-00762 SBA, 2011 WL 3739542, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (Match.com’s terms of use agreement directly conflicted with certain provisions of 
the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act); Brodsky v. Match.com L.L.C., No. 09 Civ. 5328(NRB), 
2009 WL 3490277, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009) (Match.com’s terms of use agreement directly 
conflicted with certain provisions of the New York Dating Referral Services Law).  
 15.  Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 7. 
 16.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 1. 
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I. THE ILLINOIS CASE: JANE DOE V. MATCH.COM
A. The Illinois Dating Referral Services Act 
In 1991, the Illinois state legislature enacted the IDRSA.19 The IDRSA 
was enacted to protect Illinois citizens using dating referral services.20 As 
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan stated, “Online dating and similar 
services are just like any other business. . . . Consumers who try them and 
use them have certain rights under the Illinois consumer protection laws.”21
The language in the IDRSA is straightforward. To be valid and en-
forceable, a contract between a dating referral services company and an 
Illinois consumer has to meet a number of requirements, including: 
1. The contract must be in writing;22
2. The contract contains “all provisions, requirements, and pro-
hibitions that are mandated by [the] Act . . . before it is signed 
by the customer”;23
3. A copy of the written contract is provided to the customer “at
the time the customer signs the contract”;24 and 
4. The company must “maintain original copies of all contracts 
for services for as long as the contracts are in effect and for a 
period of 3 years thereafter.”25
In addition to these technical requirements, the IDRSA also contains a 
remedies provision.26 Section 45 of the Act grants injured Illinois consum-
ers the right to recover an amount equal to three times actual damages, plus 
costs and attorney fees.27 To further protect Illinois consumers—and as 
particularly relevant here—the IDRSA mandates that “[a]ny waiver by the 
customer of the provisions of this Act shall be void and unenforceable.”28
The IDRSA’s “anti-waiver” provision is of particular importance because it 
represents the Illinois legislature’s intention to explicitly forbid Illinois 
consumers from “contracting out” or “waiving” the very laws designed to 
 19.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/1 to -55 (West 2008). 
 20.  Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 6.  
 21.  Christine des Garennes, Breaking Dating Service Contract Not Hard to Do, NEWS GAZETTE,
Feb. 15, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2195754.  
 22.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/15. 
 23.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 24.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 25.  Id.
 26.  Id. § 45. 
 27.  Id.
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2015] CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 675 
protect them.29 Anti-waiver provisions are quite common in Illinois con-
sumer protection statutes30 and in consumer protection statutes in many 
other states.31
The provisions and requirements of the IDRSA apply to every contract 
for dating referral services.32 If a contract for dating referral services does 
not comply with any of the provisions of the IDRSA, the contract is void
and unenforceable.33
B. Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement Violates the IDRSA 
Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement failed to comply with the 
IDRSA in several ways. On its face, the Terms of Use Agreement failed to 
meet a number of the above-listed requirements. For example, 
Match.com’s contract contained exculpatory and limitation of damages 
provisions in direct contradiction to the IDRSA’s remedies provision, 
which allows injured Illinois customers to recover an amount equal to three 
times actual damages, plus costs and attorney fees.34 Given that 
Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement was “designed to apply to users in 
all 50 states,”35 it is not surprising that the contract failed to comply with a 
number of the requirements set forth in the IDRSA. Moreover, 
Match.com’s failure to meet the requirements under the IDRSA was also 
likely of no surprise to Match.com, as another Illinois court in 2003 ap-
proved a settlement agreement in which Match.com agreed to correct the 
alleged contractual violations in its future subscription agreements.36
In Jane Doe v. Match.com, the Illinois court held that Match.com’s 
Terms of Use Agreement was void and unenforceable in its entirety be-
cause it was in conflict with the IDRSA and “the strong public policy un-
 29.  See also William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It 
Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 12–13 (2006) [hereinafter 
Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs].
 30.  See, e.g., Illinois Credit Services Organizations Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/8 (West 
2008) (“Any waiver by a buyer of the provisions of this Act shall be deemed void and unenforceable by 
a credit services organization as contrary to public policy”); Illinois Pre-Need Cemetery Sales Act, 815 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 390/25 (West 2008) (“Any provision of any contract which purports to waive 
any provision of this Act shall be null and void”).  
 31.  Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs, supra note 29, at 13 n.8 (citing numerous state consumer 
protection statutes that forbid the waiver of the protections they provide). 
 32.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/15. 
 33.  Id. § 35(c). 
 34.  Match.com Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at exhibit 1, at cl. 7, 8(b) & 21.  
 35.  Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 5 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012). 
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676 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:2 
derlying [the] statute.”37 While there were several violations of the Act, the 
Illinois court paid particular attention to Match.com’s violation of the 
IDRSA’s anti-waiver provision.38 The court found that by designating Tex-
as as the exclusive forum and imposing Texas law on Illinois consumers, 
Match.com’s forum selection and choice of law clauses constituted an im-
permissible waiver by the customer of all the provisions of the IDRSA.39
The court reasoned that if it enforced the forum selection and choice of law 
clauses, “Match.com users in Illinois would lose protections that the Illi-
nois legislature created for them through enacting [the] IDRSA.”40
C. Complicating the Decision with Conflicts of Law Issues 
Although the Illinois court’s decision seems straightforward, it is far 
from it. Complications arise from the use of both forum selection and 
choice of law clauses in a contract.41 A typical forum selection clause may 
read: “If there is any dispute concerning this Agreement, suit must be 
brought [exclusively] in a state or federal court in Texas.”42 Forum selec-
tion clauses designate which forum a dispute between the parties must be 
heard, but not the law that must be applied. Therefore, Match.com argued 
that if Illinois transfers Jane’s case to Texas, Illinois public policy as de-
clared by the IDRSA would not necessarily be violated because Texas 
courts could still apply Illinois law and find the contract void.43
Complications also arise when a choice of law clause enters into the 
mix. While Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement did not contain an actu-
al “waiver” of the provisions of the IDRSA (i.e., the contract did not re-
quire Jane to forgo any protections provided under Illinois law), it did 
include a choice of law clause stating that all disputes arising between the 
parties would be governed by the laws of Texas.44 In these situations, 
choice of law clauses combined with forum selection clauses, can serve as 
the “functional equivalent of [a] waiver without the use of the term.”45 Be-
 37.  Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 4. 
 38.  Id.
 39.  Id.
 40.  Id.
 41.  See Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs, supra note 29, at 13. 
 42.  See, e.g., Match.com Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at exhibit 1, at cl. 23.  
 43.  See Gamayo v. Match.com L.L.C., No. C 11-00762 SBA, 2011 WL 3739542, at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 24, 2011). 
 44.  Match.com Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at exhibit 1, at cl. 23. 
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2015] CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 677 
cause Match.com’s “waiver” of the IDRSA’s provisions came in the form 
of a choice of law clause, conflicts of law issues arose.46
Conflicts of law issues concern the relationship states have with one 
another. Each state has its own protections and rules governing those with-
in their jurisdiction.47 Therefore, in Jane Doe v. Match.com, the Illinois 
court could not simply decide the contracts issue of whether Match.com’s 
Terms of Use Agreement was valid. Rather, the court first had to determine 
the conflicts of law issue, asking whether Illinois law (the law of the fo-
rum) or Texas law (the law designated by the choice of law clause) gov-
erned the validity of the contract between the parties.48 Accordingly, in 
Jane Doe v. Match.com, the Illinois court first held that the validity of the 
contract should be determined by Illinois law and not Texas law.49 Only 
after it determined whether the Match.com contract was valid as a whole, 
would the court then consider the validity of the specific forum selection 
and choice of law clauses.50
Conversely, some federal courts have taken an entirely different ap-
proach to the same choice of law issues, leading to different results for the 
plaintiffs involved. For example, one California federal court (dealing with 
the same Match.com contract at issue in the Jane Doe case) transferred the 
plaintiff’s case to Texas before it determined whether the contract was even 
valid.51 By focusing on just the forum selection clause, Match.com can 
argue that if the forum state transfers Jane’s case to Texas, Illinois public 
policy as declared by the IDRSA would not necessarily be violated because 
Texas courts could still apply Illinois law and find the contract void.52 The 
court in Gamayo v. Match.com relied, in part, on this argument when it 
transferred the plaintiff’s case from California to Texas.53 Relying on fed-
eral precedent, the court presumed the enforcement of forum selection 
clauses and completely sidestepped any choice of law considerations or 
determinations.54 The court held that it was for Texas to determine “which 
state’s laws apply . . . .”55 In rejecting the contention that the enforcement 
of Match.com’s forum selection clause would contravene California’s pub-
 46.  Id. at 13–15. 
 47.  Id. at 14.  
 48.  Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 4 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012). 
 49.  Id. at 3.  
 50.  Id.
 51.  Gamayo v. Match.com L.L.C., No. C 11-00762 SBA, 2011 WL 3739542, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 24, 2011). 
 52.  See id. (Match.com makes this argument). 
 53.  Id.
 54.  See id. at *3. 
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lic policy as declared by its consumer protection statutes, the court rea-
soned that such an argument “required speculation as to which law the 
transferee would ultimately apply.”56 “[O]nce in the proper venue, the 
[p]laintiff is free to argue for the application of California law.”57 In theory, 
this argument has some merit. 
However, the notion that the Texas court will apply the forum court’s 
laws is a fallacy in practice, underscoring the accuracy of the Illinois 
court’s decision in Jane Doe v. Match.com when determining whether the 
contract was valid under Illinois law rather than Texas law. More often 
than not, when cases are transferred to a new forum, the transferee court’s 
laws are applied, particularly when there is a choice of law provision in-
volved.58 In Gamayo, when the plaintiffs’ case was transferred, it was un-
surprising that the Texas federal court applied Texas law instead of 
California law, even though many of the plaintiffs’ claims were based pri-
marily on protections afforded by California consumer protection statutes.59
The applicability of state law can lead to different results for the plaintiffs 
involved. In Gamayo, Texas law applied, which generally affords fewer 
consumer protections than California laws,60 and the plaintiffs’ claims were 
dismissed with prejudice.61 A similar outcome resulted in several other 
cases against Match.com, which were originally filed in more consumer 
friendly states, such as New York, and later transferred to Texas.62
The Illinois court’s choice of law decision in Jane Doe v. Match.com 
was correct for two additional reasons. First, enforcing a forum selection 
 56.  Id. (citing Besag v. Customer Decorators, Inc., No. C 08–05463 JSW, 2009 WL 330934, at 
*14 (N.D. Cal. Feb.10, 2009)). 
 57.  Id. (quoting Mazzola v. Roomster Corp., No. CV 10–5954 AHM (JCGx), 2010 WL 4916610, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 58.  See, e.g., id. at *2 (discussing Brodsky v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 3-09-CV-2066-F-BD., 
2010 WL 3895513, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2010), where a Texas federal court applied Texas law to 
plaintiffs’ claims against Match.com, even though the case was originally filed in New York under New 
York consumer protection and contract laws and later transferred to Texas by the New York federal 
court).
 59.  Robinson v. Match.com, L.L.C., 3:10-CV-2651-L, 2012 WL 3263992, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 
Aug. 10, 2012).  
 60.  The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA), an organization dedicated to criticizing 
laws favorable to plaintiff’s personal injury firms and the consumers they represent, argues that Califor-
nia is the worst “judicial hellhole” for businesses in part because of its “plaintiff-friendly consumer 
laws.” AMER. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2013–2014), available at
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/JudicialHellholes-2013.pdf; see also Erin 
Coe, Calif.’s ‘Judicial Hellhole’ Ranking Doesn’t Tell Full Story, LAW360 (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/497438/calif-s-judicial-hellhole-ranking-doesn-t-tell-full-story.  
 61.  Robinson, 2012 WL 3263992, at *19, aff’d, Malsom v. Match.com, L.L.C., 540 F. App’x. 412 
(5th Cir. 2013) (applying Texas law). 
 62.  See, e.g., Brodsky, 2010 WL 3895513, at *3 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for fraud, fraudu-
lent inducements, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices 
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2015] CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 679 
clause before determining whether that contract was even valid in the first 
place puts the “cart before the horse.” Second, and most notably, the Illi-
nois decision followed clear Illinois precedent and choice of law rules.63
This holding can be better understood through the lens of basic conflict of 
law and choice of law principles. 
Under conflict of law principles, when there is a dispute regarding 
which state’s laws to apply and no forum selection clause exists, the forum 
court determines the governing law by using its own choice of law ap-
proach.64 Generally speaking, in most contract cases, Illinois courts follow 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and apply the “most signifi-
cant relationship rule,” where the law of the state that is most significantly 
related to the outcome of the litigation applies.65 In “the most significant 
relationship” analysis, Illinois courts will also consider the state’s public 
policy principles and how those policies impact the litigation.66
However, when there is a forum selection clause, as there was in the 
Jane Doe v. Match.com case, Illinois courts have refused to apply the law 
of the forum selected when the contract or provision is at odds with Illinois 
public policy. As the Illinois Supreme Court held in First National Bank v. 
Malpractice Research,67 Illinois courts are prohibited from “rely[ing] on 
foreign law to enforce a contract that is illegal in the forum, and Illinois has 
the stronger interest in the outcome of the controversy.”68 Illinois’s reason-
ing is drawn in part from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 
187(2), which states: 
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual 
rights and duties will be applied . . . unless . . . application of the law of 
the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state
which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the deter-
mination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, 
would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective 
choice of law by the parties.69
Nevertheless, while there is much to be said about the best order in 
which courts should decide these conflicts of law disputes (and the differ-
ent conflicts of law approaches used by various state and federal courts), 
 63.  See, e.g., Scentura Creations, Inc. v. Long, 756 N.E.2d 451, 456–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 64.  Soc’y of Mount Carmel v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co. of Ill., 643 N.E.2d 1280, 1286 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1994) (emphasis added). 
 65.  See, e.g.,Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 905 (Ill. 2007). 
 66.  See Morris B. Chapman & Assocs., Ltd. v. Kitzman, 739 N.E.2d 1263, 1269–71 (Ill. 2000). 
 67.  First Nat’l Bank of Springfield v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 688 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 (Ill. 
1997).  
 68.  Id.
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this Article will only focus on the policy arguments made in support of and 
against the enforcement of choice of law clauses. The policy arguments in 
favor of enforcing choice of law clauses closely mirror those in support of 
forum selection clauses, where, as indicated at the outset of this Article, 
courts have pitted the values of individual autonomy and economic effi-
ciency against federalism and a state’s right to choose how it protects its 
consumers.
II. THE NEW YORK FEDERAL CASE: BRODSKY V. MATCH.COM
Brodsky v. Match.com is one of the primary Match.com cases at odds 
with the Illinois decision, Jane Doe.70 In Brodsky, former Match.com sub-
scribers filed a class action lawsuit in 2009 against Match.com in a New 
York federal court alleging various causes of action arising from their ex-
periences with the online dating website and service.71 In response, 
Match.com filed a motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of 
Texas pursuant to the forum selection clause in Match.com’s Terms of Use 
Agreement.72 Like in the Illinois case, Match.com’s contract with its New 
York subscribers failed to comply with several requirements of New 
York’s Dating Services Law.73
Despite this failure to comply with the Dating Services Law, the 
Brodsky court held that the forum selection clause was valid and enforcea-
ble—advancing both legal and public policy justifications.74 From the legal 
standpoint, the Brodsky court stated that, pursuant to federal precedent, 
there is a strong presumption in favor of enforcing forum selection claus-
es.75 Under federal law, this presumption can be rebutted only if the plain-
tiff establishes that the enforcement of the forum selection clause would be 
“unreasonable or unjust.”76 Instances where the enforcement of a forum 
selection clause would be unreasonable include: (1) if the clause was incor-
porated into the agreement because of fraud or overreaching; (2) if for all 
practical purposes the plaintiff would be “deprived of his day in court, due 
to the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the selected forum”; (3) if the 
plaintiff would be deprived of a remedy; and (4) “if the clauses contravene 
 70.  See Brodsky v. Match.com L.L.C., No. 09 Civ. 5328(NRB), 2009 WL 3490277, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009). 
 71.  Id. at *1.  
 72.  Id.
 73.  Id. at *4. 
 74.  Id. at *3–5.  
 75.  Id. at *2–3.  
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a strong public policy of the forum state.”77 Any exceptions to the pre-
sumption of enforceability are to be narrowly construed.78
In enforcing Match.com’s forum selection clause, the Brodsky court 
analyzed and then rejected each of the exceptions that could rebut the pre-
sumption in favor of enforcement.79 When the New York federal court 
considered the public policy exception, it acknowledged that “[t]he State of 
New York no doubt has a great interest in protecting its consumers and in 
seeing its laws enforced.”80 However, after weighing the interests for and 
against enforcement, the court concluded that “New York’s interest in pro-
tecting its consumers and businesses does not override its policy of enforc-
ing forum selection clauses.”81 This is where the Brodsky court’s legal 
justification for enforcing Match.com’s forum selection clause (i.e., the 
federal presumption in favor of enforcement) intertwined with its public 
policy justifications. 
The Brodsky court relied on two familiar public policy arguments—
individual autonomy and economic efficiency—in concluding that the pre-
sumption in favor of enforcement outweighed New York’s interest in pro-
tecting its consumers and enforcing its laws.82 The first policy argument 
was essentially that individuals have the right to contract and negotiate the 
terms of their commercial relationships with one another, freely exchang-
ing one benefit (requiring parties to sue in a specific state) for another ben-
efit (lower prices for consumers).83 In that regard, once parties reach an 
agreement, they cannot then change the terms of the agreement when they 
merely find it convenient to do so; such behavior is not only unfair to the 
contracting parties and their expectations, but goes against basic contract 
law principles holding parties to the terms of their agreements.84 In the 
court’s words: “plaintiffs cannot avoid compliance with the forum selection 
clause to which they validly assented simply by invoking a statute peculiar 
to the forum in which they filed suit (expressly in defiance of the forum 
selection clause).”85 Permitting such behavior “defies reason,” as a plaintiff 
“may circumvent forum selection . . . clauses merely by stating claims un-
 77.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Roby v. Corporation of Lloyds, 996 F.2d 1353, 1361 (2d Cir. 
1993)). 
 78.  Id.
 79.  Id. at *2–4.  
 80.  Id. at *4.  
 81.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 82.  See id.
 83.  Id. at *4. 
 84.  Id.
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der laws not recognized by the forum selected in the agreement.”86 This 
behavior ultimately amounts to forum shopping by the plaintiff.87
The second policy argument involved economic efficiency and practi-
cality. The Brodsky court explained that it was “reasonable and legitimate” 
for Match.com, which operates a website and service available “to users 
anywhere in the country,” to require that disputes arising from its service 
be resolved in Texas, where the company is headquartered.88 Further, the 
court stated that Match.com had “no practical alternative than to include a 
forum selection and choice of law clause in its User Agreement, since oth-
erwise Match[.com] could potentially be subject to suit in any of the fifty 
states arising from its website or service.”89
But Brodsky misinterprets the existing federal law and the broad ap-
plication of the public policy exception by state courts. Moreover, while the 
public policy reasons justifying the enforcement of forum selection clauses 
certainly have merit, particularly as the world economy continues to inno-
vate and globalize, they fail to respect the well-established principles of 
federalism. 
III. WHY ILLINOIS GOT IT RIGHT: LEGAL REASONS
A. There is a “Public Policy” Exception to the Presumption in Favor 
of Forum Selection Clauses 
A number of federal courts have enforced forum selection clauses in 
conflict with state consumer protection laws on the grounds that forum 
selection clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable pursuant to fed-
eral and state common law.90 Federal and state courts, including those in 
Illinois, have held that forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and 
enforceable “unless unreasonable under the circumstances.”91 However, 
these same courts have also repeatedly held that the presumption is not 
absolute; there is a public policy exception.92 The public policy exception 
appears to be designed to acknowledge concerns of federalism.93 Under-
standing the historical development of forum selection clauses at both the 
 86.  Id. (quoting Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 87.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 88.  Brodsky, 2009 WL 3490277, at *4.  
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See infra Part III.A.1.i-iii.  
 91.  Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363. 
 92.  See infra Part III.A.1.iii. 
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federal and state level and the current state of the law today can shed light 
on why the holding and reasoning in Brodsky is misguided. 
1. Historical Development of Forum Selection Clauses 
Historically, most federal and state courts viewed forum selection 
clauses with hostility, often refusing to enforce them because they were 
“contrary to public policy.”94 The theory underlying this view was that 
forum selection clauses permitted private parties to impermissibly “oust” 
the constitutionally or statutorily established jurisdiction of a court through 
contractual agreement.95 However, the judicial hostility toward forum se-
lection clauses began to fade in the 1950s, as some courts embraced the 
notion of freedom of contract.96 This change in attitude is reflected in the 
landmark case of M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore.97
a. Presumption in Favor of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal 
Courts
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court addressed the validity of fo-
rum selections clauses.98 In M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, a German 
ship towing company entered into a contract with an American company to 
tow an ocean-moving drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy.99 The contract 
between the parties included a forum selection clause mandating that all 
litigation arising from the agreement take place in London, a supposed 
neutral forum with an expertise in admiralty disputes.100 During transport, 
the American company’s rig was damaged off the coast of Florida. The 
American company disregarded the forum selection clause and brought suit 
in a Florida federal court.101
The Court declined to follow the traditional attitude regarding forum 
selection clauses, instead holding that such clauses are “prima facie valid 
 94.  M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); see also Francis M. Dougherty, 
Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be 
Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4TH 404, 409–14 (1984) (citing numerous state court cases pre-1972 that invalidat-
ed forum selection clauses on the grounds that they were contrary to public policy). 
 95.  See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958) 
(“agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contra-
ry to public policy and will not be enforced.”). 
 96.  See Young Lee, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in Diversity Cases 
and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 663, 666 (1997) (discussing why the judicial view of 
forum selection clauses began to change in the mid-twentieth century).  
 97.  407 U.S. at 1, 9–10. 
 98.  Id. at 2. 
 99.  Id.
 100.  Id. at 4, 13, 17.  
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and should be enforced” unless enforcement is deemed to be “unreasonable 
under the circumstances.”102 The Court reasoned that the “oust[er]” argu-
ment was a “vestigial legal fiction” and had “little place” in a world where 
courts are overloaded and where many local businesses now operate on a 
global scale.103 Following the Supreme Court decision in Bremen, federal 
courts adopted a strong presumption across the federal courts that forum 
selection clauses are valid absent several limited exceptions,104 discussed 
above in Part II. 
b. Presumption in Favor of Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts 
Although the Bremen decision arose under the federal courts’ admiral-
ty jurisdiction in the context of international commercial contracts and thus 
has had no binding effect on state courts,105 its analysis has had an enor-
mous impact on subsequent state court litigation.106 Most state courts, in-
cluding those in Illinois,107 have followed the Supreme Court’s lead 
declaring forum selection clauses presumptively valid.108 Only a handful of 
jurisdictions still hold that forum selection clauses are per se invalid and 
unenforceable.109
 102.  Id. at 10 (emphasis added).  
 103.  Id. at 12.  
 104.  See Michael Mousa Karayanni, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Forum 
Selection Clauses, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1996). 
 105.  See Michael D. Moberly & Carolyn F. Burr, Enforcing Forum Selection Clauses in State 
Court, 39 SW. U. L. REV. 265, 269 (2009); see also Prof’l Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 350 
(Ala. 1997) (“Bremen does not mandate that state courts enforce forum selection provisions outside of 
an admiralty context.”). 
 106.  Moberly & Burr, supra note 105, at 276.  
 107.  See, e.g., Scentura Creations, Inc. v. Long, 756 N.E.2d 451, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (“An 
express choice-of-law provision contained in a contract will be given effect subject to certain limita-
tions.”).
 108.  See Sutherland, 700 So. 2d at 350 (“[T]he courts of almost all . . . jurisdictions . . . now find 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in M/S Bremen on this issue to be persuasive.”); Walter W. Heiser, 
Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival 
Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 371 (1993) (“the vast majority of state courts have held that contractual 
forum selection clauses are valid and enforceable”).  
 109.  See Lee, supra note 96, at 680; see also High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 
S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1992) (holding that Missouri conclude “no longer treat[s] outbound forum 
selection clauses as per se violations of public policy”); Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses 
and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 72 (1992) (stating that only “[a] handful 
of states either hold [forum selection] clauses unenforceable per se or seem to apply a presumption 
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c. The Public Policy Exception 
As both federal and state courts have acknowledged, the presumption 
in favor of forum selection clauses is not absolute.110 In Bremen, the Su-
preme Court provided a broad outline of the circumstances in which courts 
may refuse to enforce forum selection clauses.111 The Court deemed that 
such clauses may be void if they were obtained by fraud, undue influence 
or unconscionable means,112 or if the designated forum was so substantially 
inconvenient or unfair that it would deprive the plaintiff of his or her “day 
in court.”113 The Court also held that such clauses may be void and unen-
forceable “if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the 
forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or judicial deci-
sion.”114 The majority of federal and state jurisdictions agree that a public 
policy exception to the enforcement of forum selection clauses exists.115
Illinois is no different. In First National Bank of Springfield v. Mal-
practice Research, Inc.,116 the Illinois Supreme Court made clear that con-
tracts are void and unenforceable if they are “clearly contrary” to Illinois 
public policy as declared by its constitution, statutes, and the decisions of 
its courts.117 When holding that Match.com’s forum selection clause was 
void and unenforceable, the Illinois court in Jane Doe was simply applying 
the public policy exception—an exception recognized by both Illinois and 
federal courts. Given the almost universal recognition of the public policy 
exception to the enforcement of forum selection clauses, why did the two 
Match.com cases reach different results? 
 110.  See Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1017–20 (explaining that “[t]he presumption in favor of 
enforcement of forum selection clauses . . . was not absolute, as the Bremen Court “noted that public 
policy was one of the exceptions set by the Court to the enforcement of forum [selection] clauses). 
 111.  Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1010–12. 
 112.  M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1972); Phillips v. Audio Active 
Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 113.  See, e.g., Gamayo v. Match.com L.L.C., Nos. C 11-00762 SBA, C 11-1076 SBA, C 11-1206 
SBA, 2011 WL 3739542, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011); Brodsky v. Match.com L.L.C., No. 09 Civ. 
5328(NRB), 2009 WL 3490277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009). 
 114.  Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 115.  See, e.g., Scentura Creations, Inc. v. Long, 756 N.E.2d 451, 456–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) 
(citing McAllister v. Smith, 17 Ill. 328, 334 (1856)) (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court has held 
that forum selection clauses are invalid and unenforceable if they are deemed to be “contrary to the 
public policy of the local government”).  
 116.  First Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 688 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 (Ill. 
1997) (quoting Schuman-Heink v. Folsom, 159 N.E. 250 (1927)). 
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2. Statutory Preemption: A Split Between the Courts 
Despite the almost universal recognition of the public policy exception 
to the enforcement of forum selection clauses, courts differ as to the scope 
and application of the exception.118 Some state courts have interpreted the 
scope and application of the public policy exception more broadly than 
their federal counterparts.119 Analyzing the difference in how some federal 
and state courts have decided the fate of forum selection clauses at odds 
with state “anti-waiver” provisions is illustrative of the point.120
In the federal case Luv2bfit, Inc. v. Curves International, Inc.,121 the 
plaintiffs, thirty-five current or former owners of a New York fitness fran-
chise, filed suit in a New York federal court against a Texas-based fran-
chiser. 122 The franchiser moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, transfer 
the case to a Texas court pursuant to two forum selection clauses contained 
in the contract between the parties.123 The New York federal court enforced 
the forum selection clause and transferred the case to Texas, despite the 
existence of an anti-waiver provision in New York’s business protection 
statute.124 The court reasoned that to interpret the “anti-waiver provision to 
mean that [the plaintiffs] cannot be required to contractually consent to 
litigating this case in a forum other than New York . . . is too broad a read-
ing of the [New York Franchise Sales Act (NYFSA)].”125 The court sug-
gested that to be held unenforceable, the language of the NYFSA had to 
“implicitly or explicitly” prohibit a New York franchisee from agreeing to 
resolve their disputes in other forums.126 Other federal courts have reiterat-
ed the same narrow interpretation—that a statute must expressly prohibit 
the parties from agreeing to litigate their disputes in another forum.127
 118.  See, e.g., Moberly & Burr, supra note 105, at 306–07.  
 119.  See also id. at 301, 304.
 120.  Compare Pong v. Am. Capital Holdings, Inc., No. CIV. S-06-2527 LKK/DAD, 2007 WL 
657790, at *5–7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2007) (holding that a forum selection clause did not violate the 
anti-waiver statute in securities fraud actions), with Hall v. Super. Ct., 197 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761–63 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1983) (holding forum selection clause void because it was in conflict with the anti-waiver 
provision in California’s Corporate Securities Law). 
 121.  Luv2bfit, Inc. v. Curves Int’l Inc., No. 06 CV 15415(CSH), 2008 WL 4443961 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 29, 2008). 
 122.  Id. at *1–2. 
 123.  Id.
 124.  Id. at *3, *6.  
 125.  Id. at *3.  
 126.  Id.
 127.  See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–97 (1991) (concluding that 
the forum selection clause was enforceable because there was no prohibition against forum selection 
clauses in the language of the Limitation of Vessel Owner’s Liability Act or its legislative history); 





      03/25/2015   13:32:44
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 172 Side A      03/25/2015   13:32:44
10P - GOULD FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2015 12:41 PM 
2015] CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 687 
By contrast, in Morris v. Towers Financial Corp.,128 a Colorado state 
court held the opposite, deciding that the anti-waiver provision in the Colo-
rado Wage Claim Act (CWCA) was sufficient to invalidate an employer’s 
forum selection clause.129 In that case, the employer attempted to dismiss 
the employee’s wage claim, arguing that New York was the exclusive ju-
risdiction pursuant to their employment contract.130 Relying on the public 
policy exception outlined in Bremen, the Colorado court held that the em-
ployer’s forum selection clause was void because it violated the strong 
public policy of Colorado embodied in the CWCA and was directly in con-
flict with the CWCA’s anti-waiver provision.131
Like the Illinois court in Jane Doe and the numerous Illinois courts 
before that, the Colorado court did the simple math. Under Bremen and its 
progeny, forum selection clauses are presumptively enforceable unless 
enforcement would “contravene a strong public policy of the forum in 
which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial deci-
sion.”132 The public policy of the forum, here Colorado, was embodied in 
its statutes, such as the CWCA.133 As explained by the Morris court, the 
CWCA “provides a clear, comprehensive statutory scheme designed to 
require employers to pay wages earned by their employees in a timely 
manner.”134 The CWCA also includes an anti-waiver provision, declaring 
that “any agreement, written or oral, by an employee purporting to waive or 
to modify his rights” under the CWCA is void and unenforceable.135 Ac-
cordingly, the forum selection clause could not be enforced.136 However, 
had there been no express anti-waiver provision prohibiting employers and 
employees from attempting to waive compliance with the CWCA, the Col-
orado court may have reached a different result.137
Illinois and Colorado courts are not alone in their decisions. Other 
state courts, such as those in California, have similarly held that anti-waiver 
[Minnesota Franchise Act’s (MFA)] anti-waiver provision voids anything in a franchise agreement or 
contract that explicitly waives . . . the MFA”). 
 128.  Morris v. Towers Fin. Corp., 916 P.2d 678 (Colo. App. 1996). 
 129.  Id. at 679.  
 130.  Id.
 131.  Id.
 132.  Id. at 679 (emphasis added) (citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).  
 133.  Id.
 134.  Id. (citing Lambdin v. Dist. Ct., 903 P.2d 1126 (Colo. 1995)). 
 135.  Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-4-125 (West 2003)). 
 136.  Id.
 137.  Cf. Adams Reload Co. v. Int’l Profit Assoc., 143 P.3d 1056, 1059 (Colo. App. 2005) (holding 
that because there was no anti-waiver provision in the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, the forum 
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provisions in state statutes invalidate forum selection clauses.138 The trend 
of state courts interpreting the Bremen public policy exception more broad-
ly can be partially explained by provincial attitudes and federalism.139 That 
is, “state courts are likely to be more familiar with, and therefore more 
protective of,” their own state’s policies and laws.140 State courts are also 
more distrusting of courts in foreign jurisdictions and, therefore, may be 
hesitant to permit foreign jurisdictions to decide whether to enforce their 
state’s laws.141 It is also important to note that the “presence of a strong 
state policy disfavoring forum selection clause[s]” is not binding on federal 
courts as it is on state courts; indeed, such state policies are just “one of 
many factors” which federal courts must consider.142
In sum, the Illinois court in Jane Doe v. Match.com had the authority 
to refuse to enforce Match.com’s forum selection clause pursuant to the 
public policy exception outlined in Bremen. For Illinois state courts, as well 
as other state courts across the country, it is immaterial whether there is a 
split amongst the courts as to the scope and application of the public policy 
exception. The fact remains that the exception exists. If Congress wants to 
create a hard rule requiring states to enforce forum selection clauses, even 
if they conflict with state laws, it needs to pass legislation to that end and 
clarify the existing uncertainty in the law.143 Without Congress stepping in, 
states will (and should) continue to have the right to decide how they want 
to protect their consumers. An examination into the principles of federalism 
provides insight into why states have this right. 
 138.  See, e.g., Hall v. Super. Ct., 197 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“California’s 
policy to protect securities investors, without more, would probably justify denial of enforcement of the 
choice of forum provision . . . but section 25701, which renders void any provision purporting to waive 
or evade the Corporate Securities Law, removes that discretion and compels denial of enforcement.”);
Rose v. Etling, 467 P.2d 633, 634–35 (Or. 1970) (Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon retail buyers 
entering retail installment contracts could not waive, even by agreement, any remedies granted to the 
retail buyer under Oregon law).  
 139.  See infra Part III.B. 
 140.  See Moberly & Burr, supra note 105, at 306–07. 
 141.  See id. at 304–07. 
 142.  Elite Physicians Serv., L.L.C. v. Citicorp Payment Serv., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-344, 2006 WL 
752536, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2006). 
 143.  Lee, supra note 96, at 681 (explaining that “[w]ith no federal statute that preempts state law 
on forum selection clauses,” defendants have “no recourse” despite any agreements they made with the 
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B. Federalism Gives States the Right to Decide for Themselves How to 
Protect Their Consumers 
Under the existing legal system, there is no legal authority for federal 
courts to preempt state consumer protection laws, regardless of how per-
suasive the policy arguments in favor of enforcement are. 
1. History of Federalism 
Preempting state consumer protection laws violates the very core of 
the United States’ federal system.144 To understand America’s federal sys-
tem and how it relates to consumer protection laws, this Part will briefly 
discuss the origins and development of our federal system. The creation of 
the concept of federalism dates back to the American Revolution. In 1776, 
the thirteen colonies declared independence from Great Britain.145 While 
the newly independent states shared the goal of independence; they also 
had strained relations, as they differed greatly in history, geography, popu-
lation, economy, and politics.146 Many of the states wanted to retain the 
powers of a sovereign nation (i.e., the ability to make treaties, receive am-
bassadors, and regulate commerce).147 However, the states recognized that 
in order to win the war and survive on the world stage, they had to coordi-
nate their military efforts and cooperate with one another on a number of 
important issues.148
After the Americans won the Revolutionary War, there was a real 
danger that the emerging country would fall apart, as states pursued their 
own interests rather than the national interests of the United States.149 In 
1787, “George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and 
other [American] leaders” sought to strengthen the country and better de-
fine the relationship between the states and the national government.150
Delegates from the states were summoned to Philadelphia, where they suc-
 144.  William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitra-
tion, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 1, 45 n.152 (2006) [hereinafter Woodward, Finding the Contract]. 
 145.  Ellis Katz, American Federalism: Past, Present and Future, 2 ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY:
REINVENTING AM. FEDERALISM 9 (1997), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0497/ijde/ijde0497.pdf. 
 146.  Linda R. Monk, Federalism, CONSTITUTION USA WITH PETER SAGAL,
http://www.pbs.org/tpt/constitution-usa-peter-sagal/federalism/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).  
 147.  Id.
 148.  Katz, supra note 145, at 9.  
 149.  Id.
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cessfully drafted the Constitution and introduced the notion of “federal-
ism.”151
In the United States’ federal system, “the people retain their basic 
sovereignty and they delegate some powers to the national government and 
reserve other powers for the states.”152 “Individuals are citizens of both the 
national government and their respective states.”153 One of the goals of 
creating a federal system was to permit both levels of government—state 
and federal—to protect the rights of citizens in case either body of govern-
ment became too powerful and tyrannical. As Alexander Hamilton ex-
plained in the Federalist Papers, “If [the peoples’] rights are invaded by 
either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.”154
Likewise, James Madison stated that the national and state governments 
“are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with 
different powers, and designed for different purposes.”155 Another purpose 
of creating a federal system was to protect the local autonomy of the 
states.156 “From these Constitutional origins, federal case law has devel-
oped a body of law giving deference to local rights,” including “the right of 
a state to enforce its own laws in its own courts . . . .”157
The Constitution expressly outlines which powers the federal govern-
ment possesses. These powers include the right to levy taxes, declare war, 
and regulate interstate and foreign commerce.158 While the Constitution 
does not explicitly say which powers are allocated to the states, it makes 
clear through the Tenth Amendment that: “[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”159 Powers traditionally 
left to the states include the power to police citizens, run local schools, 
regulate public utilities and services, and establish rules governing con-
tracts.160
 151.  Monk, supra note 146.  
152. Katz, supra note 145, at 10. 
 153.  Id.
 154.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at *3 (Alexander Hamilton), available at Westlaw 1787 WL 356. 
 155.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at *1 (James Madison), available at Westlaw 1788 WL 460. 
 156.  Joseph C. Cove, The Relationship between the Federal Government and Local Government, 5 
MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 1, § 5.1 (2012) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamil-
ton)).  
 157.  Id.
 158.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 159.  U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking 
Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 564 (2007) (“The Tenth 
Amendment tells us that there [are] realms of respective state and federal authority, without squarely 
telling us what powers lie in which realm.”). 
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There are many other powers traditionally exercised by the states 
which are actually powers shared by both the national and state govern-
ments.161 The Framers of the Constitution anticipated that there would be 
some overlap between state and federal powers, and consequently there 
could be conflict between their laws. To provide clarity in such situations, 
the Framers included a “Supremacy Clause,” declaring that if a state law 
conflicts with a federal law enacted pursuant to a constitutionally enumer-
ated power, the federal law is controlling.162 The Supremacy Clause is par-
ticularly significant to this Article’s discussion because it gives the federal 
government the power to preempt state consumer protection laws through 
federal laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.163 However, in 
situations where it is uncertain whether state law is preempted, 
“[c]onstitutional theory favors the absence of preemption on the rationale 
that it is better to presume local authority, and if such presumption causes 
difficulties Congress can always enforce its legislative purpose by remedial 
legislation rather than subordinating local authority to the federal inter-
est.”164
2. The Lack of Federal Legislation 
To date, there is no federal legislation mandating the enforcement of 
forum selection and choice of law clauses. While the “Constitution does 
not [directly] address the authority of the federal government to protect 
consumers,” the federal government nonetheless possesses this power 
through its ability to regulate interstate domestic commerce.165 Prior to 
1900, the federal government rarely passed federal consumer protection 
laws.166 Instead, the responsibility of protecting consumers rested with the 
states and local municipalities.167 However, as the country became more 
industrialized and manufactured goods increasingly streamed across state 
borders, the federal government began to step in, passing legislation target-
ing specific categories of consumer products and unfair business practices 
(e.g., laws regulating trade, food, drugs, and banking).168
 161.  See Ryan, supra note 159, at 541. 
 162.  Id.
 163.  Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1032–33.  
 164.  Cove, supra note 156, § 5.5.2.  
 165.  Edward M. Crane, Nicholas J. Eichenseer & Emma S. Glazer, U.S. Consumer Protection 
Law: A Federalist Patchwork, 78 DEFENSE COUNS. J. 305, 306 (2011). 
 166.  Id.
 167.  Id.
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Congress can enact federal legislation stating that forum selection 
clauses preempt any state laws to the contrary, including any anti-waiver 
provisions. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)169 is illustrative of this 
point. In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA “to overrule the existing com-
mon law that often invalidated arbitration agreements.”170 “Section 2 of the 
FAA proclaims that in all contracts ‘involving commerce,’ an arbitration 
agreement ‘shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”171
The FAA defines “‘commerce’ to include [any] ‘commerce among the 
several States or with foreign nations,’” with the intent to interpret the term 
“involving commerce” broadly.172 As one court put it, by enacting Section 
2 of the FAA, “Congress withdrew the power of the states to require a judi-
cial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed 
to resolve by arbitration.”173 Since the FAA’s enactment, both federal and 
state courts have upheld arbitration agreements regardless of state law.174
Notably, when refusing to enforce forum selection clauses, many state 
courts have distinguished arbitration agreements from forum selection 
clauses by highlighting the lack of federal legislation requiring the en-
forcement of forum selection clauses.175
There is an important policy reason why only federal legislation can 
require state courts to enforce forum selection clauses in conflict with state 
laws. When the federal government passes legislation, in theory, all fifty 
states have a voice through their representatives in the Senate and House. 
Moreover, the entire country may vote for the President of the United 
States, who can veto any federal bill. However, the same justification does 
not apply on the state level because state legislators have no say in the laws 
passed by legislators in other states. With the lack of any federal legislation 
mandating the enforcement of forum selection clauses and the resulting 
uncertainty in the federal and state courts as to when such clauses can be 
enforced, it is not surprising that Match.com has recently opted to include 
an arbitration clause in its Terms of Use Agreement.176 Clause 19 of 
 169.  9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2014). 
 170.  James Zimmerman, Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise Agreements and 
the Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 759, 763 (1998). 
 171.  Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C.A. § 2). 
 172.  Grohn v. Sisters of Charity Health Servs., 960 P.2d 722, 725 (Colo. App. 1998) (quoting 9 
U.S.C.A. § 1). 
 173.  Id. at 728 (emphasis added). 
 174.  Zimmerman, supra note 170, at 763–64. 
 175.  See e.g., Grohn, 960 P.2d at 727–28. 
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Match.com’s 2014 Terms of Use Agreement states: “The exclusive means 
of resolving any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Agree-
ment (including any alleged breach thereof), the Service, or the Website 
shall be BINDING ARBITRATION administered by the American Arbi-
tration Association.”177
However, federal legislation is not the only solution for clarifying the 
uncertainty in the law. As exemplified by the creation of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, states can pass model codes similar to one another if 
they believe such model codes would be mutually beneficial to all the par-
ticipant states. Given that this has not happened yet—at least not success-
fully—the states seem content with passing and enforcing their own 
consumer protection laws, which they deem best suited for their residents. 
3. Making Trade-offs 
The IDRSA is a consumer protection statute. Unlike many foreign ju-
risdictions, the United States does not have a single, comprehensive code 
outlining its consumer protection laws.178 Rather, consumer protection laws 
in the United States are a “patchwork” of often interrelated and overlapping 
federal and state laws.179 This patchwork is not by accident; it is the conse-
quence of the United States’ federal system.180
While permitting each of the fifty states to create their own consumer 
protection laws can be burdensome for businesses engaged in interstate 
trade, it is the trade-off of our federal system.181 In fact, having differences 
amongst the states regarding what is the best trade-off is not only accepta-
ble, but also encouraged.182 As the United States Supreme Court has em-
phasized, one of the biggest strengths of the “Nation-State relationship in 
our federal system” is the freedom provided to states to “serve as a labora-
tory; and try novel social and economic experiments.”183 In the online da-
ting context, the states “as a laboratory” concept is illustrated by the 
increase in various online dating services laws across the country.184 As 
http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx (last revised Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Match.com
2014 Terms of Use Agreement].
 177.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 178.  Crane, Eichenseer & Glazer, supra note 165, at 305. 
 179.  Id. at 305–06.
 180.  Id.
 181.  Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs, supra note 29, at 11–14. 
 182.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973). 
 183.  Id. at 50 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)).
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millions of Americans have begun to use online dating websites, and con-
cerns for online safety have risen, states have experimented with differing 
levels of protection, with some states even requiring online dating services 
to disclose their criminal background screening practices.185
Moreover, the Framers of the Constitution expected that states would 
be the principal lawmakers in the federal system when it came to domestic 
issues.186 This theory was in recognition of the belief that “law arises out of 
the need to address distinctly local problems” and, in that vein, states were 
best suited for solving the problems in their own backyards, as they are 
most familiar with their own distinct geography, economy, and popula-
tion.187 Accordingly, without federal legislation mandating the enforcement 
of forum selection clauses, states can continue to make their own trade-offs 
and decide for themselves how they want to protect their consumers. 
IV. WHY ILLINOIS GOT IT RIGHT: PUBLIC POLICY REASONS
The courts that have enforced forum selection clauses in conflict with 
state consumer protection laws have based their decision on primarily pub-
lic policy grounds.188 Lacking federal legislation, these courts simply en-
gaged in a weighing of values, where individual autonomy and economic 
efficiency arguments outweighed any federalism concerns.189 This Article 
takes the opposite position because: first, the public policy arguments cited 
in Bremen are less persuasive in personal injury cases involving contracts 
of adhesion; second, there is a risk of wholesale displacement of state con-
sumer protections laws; and third, consumers are at an even greater disad-
vantage vis-à-vis big business. 
A. The Public Policy Arguments Cited in Bremen are Less Persuasive 
in Personal Injury Cases Involving Contracts of Adhesion 
The Bremen court and its progeny have highlighted numerous policy 
reasons for enforcing forum selection clauses, including economic efficien-
cy, party autonomy, and practicality (in an era of increasing globaliza-
tion).190 As discussed above,191 the Brodsky court drew on many of the 
same policy arguments. 
 185.  Id.
 186.  Katz, supra note 145, at 10. 
 187.  Cove, supra note 156, § 5.1 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton)).  
 188.  See, e.g., Brodsky v. Match.com L.L.C., No. 09 Civ. 5328 (NRB), 2009 WL 3490277, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2009). 
 189.  See supra Part II.  
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First, these proponents argue that forum selection clauses play an im-
portant role in providing predictability and certainty for parties in commer-
cial relationships,192 leading to the smooth functioning and growth of 
interstate and international commerce.193 In agreeing to litigate future dis-
putes in a specific forum, parties are able to plan ahead and consider the 
risks and costs associated with a business transaction should unforeseen 
problems develop.194 Parties are also able to choose a forum that is conven-
ient, neutral, and possesses expertise in the related business.195 As numer-
ous courts have emphasized, providing predictability and certainty is 
particularly important in the international context,196 where a potential de-
fendant can face tremendous burdens if he is forced to litigate disputes 
under unexpectedly distant and/or hostile forums and laws.197
Second, these proponents argue that forum selection clauses provide 
economic advantages to both businesses and the courts.198 Simply put, pre-
dictability and certainty lead to reduced transaction costs.199 For example, 
through the use of standard form contracts, businesses can mandate that all 
litigation related to a product or service take place in a specific state or 
county, allowing businesses to enhance efficiency and reduce costs by con-
solidating actions and retaining the same local counsel.200 Similarly, by 
enforcing forum selection clauses, litigants are also spared the time and 
expense of determining the correct forum through pretrial motions, thereby 
further conserving limited judicial resources.201 The conservation of judi-
cial resources is particularly beneficial in an era where many American 
courts are “overloaded,”202 and where debt-ridden federal and state gov-
ernments are continually trying to cut down on unnecessary spending. 
Third, proponents argue that in addition to businesses and the courts, 
consumers benefit as well. This is because predictability and lower transac-
 191.  See supra Part II.  
 192.  Lee, supra note 96, at 664. 
 193.  See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363. 
 194.  Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1009. 
 195.  Id.
 196.  M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (“The elimination of all such 
uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element 
in international trade, commerce, and contracting.”).  
 197.  Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363. 
 198.  Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1009. 
 199.  See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991). 
 200.  Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum 
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 700 (1992). 
 201.  Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593–94. 
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tion costs often result in lower prices for consumers.203 For example, a 
$1,000 ticket for a cruise would likely cost more if the cruise line had to 
consider the potential costs of litigating a suit anywhere in the United 
States, as such litigation could be expensive and would certainly impact the 
company’s profits.204
Lastly, proponents argue that forum selection clauses should be en-
forced because notions of individual freedom to contract and individual 
autonomy are at the root of the American judicial system.205 They concede 
that a litigant’s right to select a forum to bring suit is unquestionably a val-
uable right,206 but argue that individual parties should have the freedom to 
control the terms and expectations of their commercial relationships with 
one another,207 and bargain away certain rights when they deem it benefi-
cial to do so.208 As one federal court put it, “One aspect of personal liberty 
is the entitlement to exchange statutory rights for something valued more 
highly.”209 Accordingly, when forum selection clauses are included in con-
tracts, proponents argue that they are often bargained for in consideration 
for some other benefits, such as a reduced cost in product or service, and 
thus accurately reflect the negotiated value of the contract as a whole.210 By 
refusing to enforce forum selection clauses, courts would be permitting 
certain parties to receive better deals than either party intended or bar-
gained for. 
Undoubtedly, the policy arguments in Bremen and its progeny have 
some merit. As the world economy globalizes and competition among 
businesses increases, the United States and its legal system must adapt to 
ensure the country’s continued growth and innovative edge. There is a le-
gitimate concern that substantial increases in legal costs (and other associ-
 203.  Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 594 (explaining that passengers purchasing cruise tickets 
containing the forum selection clause likely got reduced prices “reflecting the savings that the cruise 
line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.”).  
 204.  Id.
 205.  M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11 (explaining that a favorable approach toward forum selection 
clauses “accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the ex-
panding horizons of American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world”). 
 206.  See Gen. Instrument Corp. v. Tie Mfg., 517 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“[t]he 
bench and bar has always regarded choice of forum as a significant right.”). 
 207.  See Lee, supra note 96, at 666.  
 208.  See M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12. 
 209.  Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’n Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 929 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
 210.  See also Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(presuming that a party who has agreed to litigate abroad has received some compensation for the risk); 
Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993) (reasoning that forum agreements should 
principally be enforceable because the financial effect of a forum selection clause will be reflected in 
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ated burdens) could negatively impact American businesses and, in turn, 
hamper the country’s economic growth and entrepreneurial spirit. The in-
creased burdens and costs described above could likely be swallowed by 
larger businesses, such as Match.com, who have teams of attorneys to en-
sure compliance with local laws and litigate in remote places; the same 
cannot be said about smaller businesses, which typically do not have the 
same resources. Still, technology is a two-way street. It has not only 
brought businesses and consumers from across the world together, thereby 
increasing interstate and international litigation, but it has also been a driv-
ing force in reducing the costs of litigation. For example, with digital tech-
nologies like Skype, depositions can be taken remotely, saving parties both 
time and money. Similarly, with the advent of the Internet and more so-
phisticated government websites and databases, court documents, such as 
pleadings and motions, can be filed online in many courtrooms across the 
country.211
While the policy arguments made in Bremen and its progeny certainly 
do raise important concerns, they should not be determinative to the issues 
at hand. Specifically, the economic efficiency and freedom of contract pol-
icy arguments are not equally persuasive in all circumstances. When de-
termining whether to enforce forum selection clauses, courts must consider 
the type of parties involved in the contract, the circumstances in which the 
contract was agreed to, and the nature of the dispute.212 There is a stark 
difference between presuming the enforcement of forum selection clauses 
freely assented to and bargained for by sophisticated commercial entities, 
such as the contract between the parties in Bremen, and presuming the en-
forcement of forum selection clauses in personal injury cases involving 
contracts of adhesion, such as the contract at issue in the Match.com cases. 
First, personal injury claims are distinguishable from contract dis-
putes. As a matter of principle, courts have “recognized that the interests of 
protecting and preserving human life weigh heavily when compared with 
that of protecting the economic integrity of various entities.”213 According-
ly, in situations “where one must decide whether to implement a certain 
norm aimed at protecting the physical integrity of humans or one aimed at 
protecting economic welfare, preference should be given to the former.”214
 211.  PACER, https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).  
 212.  The benefits associated with forum selection clauses are quite clear in cases involving freely 
negotiated contracts between sophisticated commercial entities. However, the same benefits may not 
apply in cases involving unsophisticated consumers who “agreed” to the terms of a forum selection 
clause through a click-wrap agreement (which they likely did not read).  
 213.  Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1040.  
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In that vein, torts are inherently more personal and thus more local. For 
example, in Jane Doe, Jane was allegedly raped in Chicago, where the 
lawsuit was filed. All of the witnesses were in Chicago as well as the as-
sailant, Ryan Logan. In Jane’s personal injury lawsuit, where Ryan Logan 
was also named as a defendant, a Texas court would not have had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the suit or personal jurisdiction over Ryan. Ulti-
mately, there would need to be two trials, one in Chicago, Illinois, and one 
in Dallas, Texas. By contrast, had Jane Doe sued Match.com over a pay-
ment dispute, there would have been a weaker personal connection to Chi-
cago. While Match.com advertised in Chicago to Chicago-area residents, 
and the contract was entered into in Chicago, a contract dispute over pay-
ment does not strike the same inherently local and deeply personal nerve 
associated with sexual assault or rape. And from a fairness standpoint, it 
does not seem right that the victim of an assault, battery, or any other simi-
lar tort be forced to bear the burden of extra travel costs and related ex-
penses. 
Second, it is important to distinguish contracts of adhesion from those 
contracts that are freely negotiated. “Contracts of adhesion” are standard 
form contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, “usually presented to 
a consumer by a business entity.”215 There typically is no contemplation or 
negotiation over any of the terms of the contract, which are generally draft-
ed by the “stronger party to the transaction.”216 One familiar example of a 
contract of adhesion is the Google Terms of Service Agreement, which 
“govern[s] the use of Google’s websites, such as Google search, Gmail, or 
YouTube.”217 In these types of contracts, the public policy justifications for 
enforcement are diminished because contracts of adhesion, like the click-
wrap agreements used by Match.com, are often not “accepted knowingly 
and voluntarily (and for consideration).”218 These types of contracts are 
often excessively long and contain legalese. The use of small print also 
makes them difficult to read and understand.219 Unsurprisingly, most con-
sumers do not read them.220
 215.  Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE 
J. ON REG. 313, 346 (2011).  
 216.  Id.
 217.  Id.
 218.  Id. at 347. 
 219.  Lucille M. Ponte, Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in Clickwrap Dispute Resolution 
Clauses and a Proposal for Improving the Quality of These Online Consumer “Products”, 26 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 119, 160–61 (2011).  
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B. We Risk the Wholesale Displacement of State Consumer            
Protection Laws 
In addition, by enforcing forum selection and choice of law clauses 
promulgated en masse across the country, regardless of whether they con-
flict with a forum state’s own laws, we risk the wholesale displacement of 
state consumer protection laws.221 Through the wide-scale use of forum 
selection and choice of law clauses in adhesion contracts, businesses can 
choose a state with favorable consumer protection laws and impose those 
laws on citizens of the other forty-nine states.222 State legislatures ultimate-
ly lose their ability to protect consumers in their own state. 
In the article “Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and 
Arbitration,” William J. Woodward highlights some of the serious prob-
lems with allowing businesses to impose a chosen state’s laws on consum-
ers of a different state.223 As Woodward explains, when state lawmakers 
determine how much consumer protection they will provide their residents, 
they engage in a complicated political process that balances the state’s 
interest in protecting its residents with the state’s interest in creating a fa-
vorable business environment.224 In theory, a favorable business environ-
ment can create more jobs and tax revenue, which can be redistributed to a 
state’s residents in the form of lower taxes and other benefits.225 But the 
question is: at what cost? States have to make trade-offs, where they create 
or give up some level of consumer protection in exchange for a more or 
less favorable business environment.226
Under the U.S. federal system, each state can decide for itself the 
proper “mix” of consumer protection it provides vis-à-vis its businesses.227
While some states, like Delaware, have prided themselves on a more favor-
able business environment, other states, like California, have chosen a more 
consumer friendly balance, even if it makes the State’s business environ-
ment less favorable.228 The system works the way it is designed and is fair 
so long as the citizens of a state receive the benefit of the actual “mix” their 
state provides.229
 221.  Woodward, Finding the Contract, supra note 144, at 45. 
 222.  Id. at 39.  
 223.  Id. at 45 n.152.  
 224.  Id.
 225.  Id.
 226.  Id.
 227.  Id. at 40, 45. 
 228.  Id. at 45. 
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If citizens do not receive the actual “mix” their state provides, and in-
stead receive the “mix” of another state, then the federal balance is upset.230
For illustrative purposes, assume the truth of what many pro-business lob-
byists assert—that there is a correlation between a state’s consumer protec-
tion laws and its tax level.231 The people living in “high” consumer protec-
protection states have higher taxes (in exchange for more protections), and 
the people living in “low” consumer protection states have lower taxes (in 
exchange for fewer protections).232 If citizens of a “high” consumer protec-
tion state are subjected to the laws of a “low” protection state (by forum 
selection and choice of law provisions), they receive an unintended, and 
often unfair, balance (i.e., high taxes and low consumer protection).233
“Low” regulation states have an incentive to encourage this result because 
it makes them even more attractive to businesses.234
C. We Put Consumers at an Even Greater Disadvantage Vis-à-Vis Big 
Business
Similarly, states risk putting their citizens at an even greater disad-
vantage vis-à-vis big business, which already dictates the terms of their 
interactions with consumers. Generally, businesses, as “repeat players” in 
the legal system, have huge advantages over consumers in dispute resolu-
tion. 235 Businesses have superior economic power and resources, enjoy 
economies of scale, and, through repetitive interactions, can develop 
friendly and cooperative relationships with court officials and the courts.236
Unlike consumers, who are typically “one-shotters,” businesses engage in 
litigation with long-term considerations and try to shape the development 
of the law through court precedent.237 Repeat players do not just consider 
the immediate financial stakes of an individual dispute.238 Rather, they 
often play the odds in their favor by settling cases that would create adverse 
precedent and litigating cases that will likely create rules promoting their 
interests.239
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id.
 232.  Id.
 233.  Id.
 234.  Id.
 235.  Shauhin Talesh, How the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in the Twenty-First Century, 62 DEPAUL
L. REV. 519, 519 (2013). 
 236.  Id. at 523–24. 
 237.  Id. at 523. 
 238.  Id.
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In addition to shaping the law through strategic gamesmanship, busi-
nesses also shape the law through legislation.240 Unlike consumers, busi-
nesses have the money and resources to hire lobbying groups to influence 
state and federal legislation. The influence large internet companies has had 
on state legislation regarding the behavioral marketing industry is illustra-
tive of the point. As online privacy expert Lori Andrews explains, big data 
companies like Facebook and Google give immense sums of money to 
politicians to block or influence any legislation against their interests in 
collecting user information—and use lobbyists to “strong arm” politicians 
they cannot buy.241 The death of several bills in the 1990s that attempted to 
protect consumers’ personal information, including an individual’s credit 
history, purchases, and travel patterns, supports this argument.242
Accordingly, when consumer protection statutes are passed, states 
should be provided the means to enforce those laws, absent federal legisla-
tion to the contrary, because it helps equalize the unequal playing field. As 
Shauhin Talesh explains in “How the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in the 
Twenty-First Century,” legislatures pass consumer protection and remedial 
statutes, in theory, to “bolster the position of one-shotters” and/or protect 
disadvantaged groups, such as consumers.243 Consumer protection statutes 
attempt to equalize the playing field, so to speak, by providing consumers 
with fee-shifting, punitive damages, and attainable benchmarks for estab-
lishing liability.244
CONCLUSION
The Illinois court in Jane Doe v. Match.com had the authority to, and 
did, refuse to enforce Match.com’s forum selection clause pursuant to the 
public policy exception outlined in Bremen. The Brodsky case and other 
cases that came to the same conclusion have missed the mark. For Illinois 
state courts, as well as other state courts across the country, it is immaterial 
whether there is a split amongst the courts as to the scope and application 
of the public policy exception. The fact is that the exception exists. To 
 240.  Interview by Phawker.com with Lori Andrews, Director, Inst. for Sci., Law & Tech. at Ill. 
Inst. of Tech. (Jan. 12, 2013), available at http://www.phawker.com/2012/01/12/qa-with-online-
privacy-expert-lori-andrews/.  
 241.  Id.
 242.  William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 987–89 (1996) (explaining how the marketing lobby was able to derail 
attempts by the California, New Jersey, and New York legislatures to protect consumers’ personal 
information). 
 243.  Talesh, supra note 235, at 526. 
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preempt state consumer protection laws and any associated anti-waiver 
provisions, Congress must pass legislation to that end and clarify the exist-
ing uncertainty in the law.245 However, without Congress stepping in, fed-
eral courts should respect the principles of federalism and not enforce 
forum selection clauses that are in conflict with state consumer protection 
laws— at least in personal injury cases involving contracts of adhesion. 
 245.  See supra note 143 and accompanying text.  
